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Two Monsters in Search of a Concept
  Robert Yanal
Abstract
What is a monster? At least three concepts have been
proposed: Aristotle thinks a monster to be a "mistake of
purpose" in nature; Noël Carroll thinks a monster to be a
scientifically impossible being that arouses disgust and fear;
Cynthia Freeland thinks a monster to be an evil being. Thus a
two-headed calf is an Aristotelian monster; a werewolf a
monster on Carroll's definition; and Norman Bates of
Hitchcock's Psycho a monster on Freeland's concept. These
have no interesting overlaps. My project is to discuss Norman
Bates and Mark Lewis (of Michael Powell's Peeping Tom). Bates
and Lewis are monsters, but only on Aristotle's concept.
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1. Three concepts of monstrosity
Philosophers have recently become interested in exploring the
genre of horror fiction and the concomitant concept of
monstrosity. Books by Noël Carroll and Cynthia Freeland are
the leading studies on these topics. Each has an opinion on
Alfred Hitchcock's Psycho (1960) and Michael Powell's Peeping
Tom (also 1960), and on the monstrosity of Psycho's Norman
Bates (Anthony Perkins) and Peeping Tom's Mark Lewis (Carl
Boehm). In brief: Carroll thinks that neither Psycho nor
Peeping Tom are horror stories and that neither Bates nor
Lewis are monsters; Freeland holds the opposite view. I will
argue that both are wrong. Psycho and Peeping Tom are horror
stories, though not for Carroll's reasons; and Bates and Lewis
are monsters, but not for Freeland's reasons. I'll begin with an
ancient account of monstrosity.
In Aristotle's Physics a monster is a mistake of nature,
something that failed to attain its natural end. "Now surely as
in intelligent action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in
each action, if nothing interferes. Now intelligent action is for
the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is so. ...
Now mistakes come to pass even in the operations of art: the
grammarian makes a mistake in writing and the doctor pours
out the wrong dose. Hence clearly mistakes are possible in the
operations of nature also. If then in art there are cases in
which what is rightly produced serves a purpose, and if where
mistakes occur there was a purpose in what was attempted,
only it was not attained, so must it be also in natural products,
and monstrosities will be failures in the purposive effort."[1]
Aristotle's example of such a failure is borrowed from
Empedocles, an ox with a man's face, though from his
discussion it isn't clear whether Aristotle believes such a thing
existed, or whether he simply presents this as a famous
example of a possible monster. In any case, for Aristotle
monsters now and then occur as missteps of purpose in nature
just as grammatical mistakes now and then intrude on purpose
in writing and wrong doses here and there ruin healing.
Noël Carroll takes a monster to be "a being in violation of the
natural order, where the perimeter of the natural order is
determined by contemporary science." Contemporary science,
of course, is the state of scientific knowledge now, and
scientific knowledge may enlarge over time. "Superman is not
compossible with what is known of the natural order by
science," Carroll writes. "He may at a later date become so, as
knowledge of other planets and galaxies advances, but I
wouldn't bet on it."[2]
But Superman, while a monster, is not a horrific monster, the
stories in which he appears not horror stories. A horror story
must aim at arousing what Carroll calls "art-horror," a
combination of fear and disgust caused by and directed
towards a monster that is threatening and impure.[3] A
monster is impure if it is "categorically interstitial" (sometimes
described as a "mixture of what is normally distinct") such as
an animal that is part fly, part man; or if it is "categorically
contradictory" such as a vampire that is both living and dead;
or if it is "incomplete" such as a severed hand that acts on its
own; or if it is "formless" such as a malevolent fog or a people-
eating blob.[4]
Another writer on horror, Cynthia Freeland, objects. "If
monsters are really 'super-natural' as he [Carroll] thinks, then
a real-life monster like Bob Rusk in Frenzy does not quite fit
the paradigm." For Freeland, horror films are about evil, and
"monsters are usually (though not always) evil in horror
movies ...."[5] Some of the characters Freeland takes to be
monsters are obviously supernatural: the six-foot cockroaches
that can assume human shapes in Guillermo del Toro's Mimic
(1997), for example. Some of Freeland's monsters are
empirically possible, including Catherine Deneuve's
psychotically depressed character in Roman Polanski's
Repulsion (1963) and the shark of Stephen Spielberg's Jaws
(1975) - at least she assumes that film's great white is
consistent with current shark science. For Freeland, what
makes these monsters is their evilness.
So we have three concepts of a monster: a mistake in natural
teleology, though one that occurs now and again in nature
(Aristotle); an empirically impossible being that is "impure" and
that arouses fear and disgust (Carroll); and an evil creature,
sometimes empirically impossible, sometimes "real-life"
(Freeland). These concepts concur with ordinary ways of
speaking in which we might describe a two-headed calf, a
werewolf, and Pol Pot, the architect of mass genocide against
the Cambodians, as monsters.
Do these beings have anything interesting in common? That is,
are the monsters described by Aristotle, Carroll, and Freeland
species of an overarching genus of monstrosity? It would seem
not. The two-headed calf is natural development gone wrong,
the werewolf a scientifically impossible being, and Pol Pot quite
natural but very evil. Perhaps some commonality might be
found in our reaction to these beings. Even here, however,
there seems no common ground. Aristotle's natural deformities
arouse pity and in extreme cases repulsion; Carroll tells us
(his) monsters arouse fear and disgust; Freeland's evildoers
arouse moral indignation. This suggests that "monster" has
three distinct meanings - or to put it another way, the term
"monster" can denote any one of three distinct concepts. (This
is not to say that monsters bear a "family resemblance" to one
another. Where are the "threads of similarity" that
Wittgenstein required?)
2. Carroll and Freeland on Psycho and Peeping Tom
My interest here are the "natural monsters," Norman Bates and
Mark Lewis. Because he takes a horror story by definition to
evoke fear and disgust, Carroll thinks Psycho and Peeping Tom
are properly tales of terror rather than tales of horror: "though
eerie and unnerving, [they] achieve their frightening effects by
exploring psychological phenomena that are all too human."[6]
But Norman Bates worries Carroll. Bates is, for Carroll, "a
schizophrenic, a type of being that science countenances."
Thus he is not a monster "technically speaking." Yet Bates
"resembles the impure beings at the core of the concept of art-
horror. He is Nor-man: neither man nor woman but both. He is
son and mother. He is of the living and the dead. He is both
victim and victimizer. He is two persons in one. He is
abnormal, that is, because he is interstitial. In Norman's case,
this is a function of psychology rather than biology."[7] It is
indisputable that Norman Bates is possible within the laws of
nature. Robert Bloch, author of the novel Psycho, based
Norman Bates on Ed Gein, the horrific serial killer of Wisconsin
- or I should say on what he knew about Ed Gein. Suffice it to
say that Gein's atrocities were far more horrible than Norman
Bates's.[8] However, if the impurities Carroll purports to find in
Bates's psychology are fictional truths of Psycho - two persons
in one; both living and dead; son and mother - then Bates is
not (just) a schizophrenic consistent with science. He really is a
"mixture of what is normally distinct" or a "categorically
contradictory" being, hence truly (and not just apparently) a
monster under Carroll's concept.
Carroll takes literally the criminal psychiatrist Dr. Richmond
(Simon Oakland) who at the end of Psycho offers his diagnosis
of Norman Bates to the gathered reporters. He's heard the
story from Norman Bates's mother, he tells us; Norman Bates
no longer exists. This, taken literally (which may not be how
Dr. Richmond meant it), would imply that Psycho is a back-
from-the-dead or spirit-possession film. Somehow, against
what scientific knowledge countenances, Mrs. Bates's
consciousness survived bodily death and has returned to reside
in her son, eventually winning a psychic battle by extinguishing
his mind. On such a reading, Norman Bates's body has
incorporated his mother's consciousness and ultimately lost his
own, a grotesque iteration of Locke's puzzle case: "For should
the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the
prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as
soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be
the same person with the prince, accountable only for the
prince's action ...."[9]
But either the psychiatrist has got part of it wrong or he was
speaking hyperbolically. Norman Bates isn't literally possessed
by his mother. Nothing in Psycho signals that the afterlife is
somehow involved. The Bates mansion is creepy but it is not a
haunted house. Compare Psycho with The Possession of Joel
Delaney (1972), a film in which it is clearly a fictional truth that
Joel Delaney is possessed by the spirit of a recently deceased
Hispanic friend (Delaney suddenly begins to speak Spanish, for
one thing). Norman Bates, in contrast, is delusional. It is a
fictional truth of Psycho that he thinks himself to be his
mother. This is different from being his mother (in Locke's
prince-cobbler sense). It is not, then, a fictional truth of Psycho
that Bates is "interstitial." This makes him on Carroll's theory
not a monster at all, a conclusion with which Carroll would
agree, though it also subverts Carroll's attempts to explain why
others take Bates to be a monster.
Freeland takes Hitchcock's Psycho and Michael Powell's Peeping
Tom to be films that "permanently altered the face of the
horror-film monster," not only by "turning him into the boy
next door" but by inviting audience sympathy for him.[10]
Freeland is right about audience sympathy. Hitchcock,
scriptwriter Joseph Stefano, and Anthony Perkins conspired to
turn Bloch's Norman Bates, a fat, middle-aged, bespectacled,
charmless, and alcoholic mess into the young, handsome, shy,
philosophical motel keeper movie-goers have come to know.
(The film also tones down the crimes of the novel's Bates who
decapitates Marion Crane in the shower.) After the abrupt
dispatch of Marion Crane (Janet Leigh), Psycho's audience
turns to Bates as an object of sympathetic concern. We want to
sympathize with him - because of his loneliness, his boyish
good looks, the burden he has in caring for a destructive
mother, the fact that he seems his mother's victim, and most
of all because he seems to have been deprived of a real life.
Mark Lewis, also young, shy, intelligent, and handsome, is
positioned as a victim of his father, a scientist who conducted
cruel experiments on his little boy to record on film and in
books the boy's reactions to fear. We see Mark's violence as a
direct cause of his father's cold cruelty - his father's voice is
still heard on film saying, "Don't be a silly boy. There's nothing
to be afraid of." While we must wait until nearly the end of
Psycho to discover that it was Norman not Mrs. Bates who
murdered Marion Crane and the private detective Arbogast
(Martin Balsam), we know right from the beginning of Peeping
Tom that Mark Lewis has murdered at least one woman, a
prostitute, while filming the deed. (We must wait until nearly
the end to discover that he also uses a mirror to reflect the
fear of his victims back to them.) Our sympathy for Mark Lewis
is thus even more compromised than our sympathy for Norman
Bates (which might in part account for the extremely hostile
reception accorded Peeping Tom upon its initial release).
However, it is not clear whether Bates or Lewis should count as
monsters under Freeland's concept. Are they evil? If this
means, Are they intentionally evil, doing evil for evil's sake,
then the answer is, arguably, No. Bates is, by the time of
Marion Crane's arrival at the motel, very, very ill. He kills in the
persona of his mother and when back to himself really seems
not to realize what "he" has done. "Mother! Oh God, what-?
Blood, blood! Mother!" Norman cries from the house after
Marion's murder. He rushes to the motel, and nearly retches
from the sight. Mark Lewis is more in control of himself - at
least he doesn't go into the trance-like state Norman Bates
does when killing - yet as he himself recognizes, he is in the
grip of a compulsion which he calls "scoptophilia".
Both Norman Bates and Mark Lewis are acting under internal
psychological compulsion. They thus resemble repetitive
exhibitionists and kleptomaniacs, though they are, of course,
far more dangerous. The compulsive can't fully control his
actions, even though he realizes that what he does is irrational
and possibly dangerous to himself and others. One writer on
legal insanity, Joel Feinberg, gives an example of a
kleptomaniac high school student who had in his possession
stolen property including "14 silverine watches, 2 old brass
watches, 2 old clocks, 24 razors, 21 pairs of cuff buttons, 15
watch chains, 6 pistols, 7 combs, 34 jack knives, 9 bicycle
wrenches, 4 padlocks, 7 pairs of clippers ..." and so on.[11]
Norman Bates is too divorced from his mother persona to
recognize his illness, let alone control his actions. Mark Lewis,
however, is aware of his scoptophilia. He even briefly consults
a psychiatrist, a consultant on the movie set where Mark
works, about curing his condition, and is breezily told that it
would take three years of thrice-weekly analysis. Mark has
some control over his actions, but not enough. He is in the grip
of impulses he barely understands and which overtake him now
and again, which is part of how Feinberg demarcates
compulsive from normal behavior: the sick or compulsive's
motives appear unintelligible both to us and to the compulsive
himself; his motives, further, are irrational in that the actions
performed are often done at great risk with little gain for the
actor; that is, they do not further any of the actor's other
interests.[12] In sum, neither Norman Bates nor Mark Lewis
have enough intentionality at the root of their murders to
clearly count as evil; and it is this lack of control that allows
them some moral exculpation for their terrible deeds.
Freeland finds Peeping Tom "problematic" because of "how
attractive it makes the serial killer at its center... Everything
about him is explained so that we can understand his motives
and see why he does what he does... So is he evil?... Reason
tells us that Mark is an evil perverted killer, but our emotions
might be guided by Helen's responses of sympathy and
empathic interest."[13] This, however, side-steps an important
question, and disregards the information conveyed by our
emotional responses. If Mark Lewis deserves some moral
exculpation for his actions, and I don't see how one can avoid
that conclusion, then he is in that sense not evil - or his evil is
substantially lessened, probably below monster-level evil. Mark
is certainly dangerous, pathetic, perhaps deserving of
incarceration and treatment. But is he as evil as a monster
needs to be? Compare Mark Lewis with other, later, cinematic
serial killers who act with far more intent and control, such as
Freddie Krueger of Wes Craven's Nightmare on Elm Street
(1984) and Hannibal Lecter of Jonathan Demme's The Silence
of the Lambs (1990). Lecter has an almost preternatural
combination of reason in control of horrible desires. Even Frank
Booth (Dennis Hopper) of David Lynch's Blue Velvet (1986),
who is obviously crazy, still acts with control and intent. He
would probably count as a monster on Freeland's view, but
Booth is different from Norman Bates and Mark Lewis. Booth is
evil, but Bates and Lewis are pathetic.
The problem Freeland runs into with Mark Lewis is a fuzziness
in her concept of evil. How evil must something be before it
counts as a monster? Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot had millions
murdered. They were acting intentionally and certainly have
achieved monster-level evil. Must someone be a murderer of
millions before he is a monster? Or would only a handful
count? Are the kindly old aunts of Frank Capra's Arsenic and
Old Lace (1944) monsters? Suppose a person stops at one
murder. Would this exonerate him from monster-hood, or
would it depend on how he killed his victim? What about a man
who bilks people out of their retirement savings? Is he a
monster? Is a professor who plagiarizes from his graduate
student? Is someone who jumps the turnstile at the subway a
monster? Must a person be sane (in control of his actions)
before he can count as a monster? If we don't require
intentional evil, should rabid dogs and hurricanes count as
monsters?
Ironically, Carroll who wants to avoid the conclusion that
Norman Bates is a monster actually invites it, though for the
wrong reasons; and Freeland who believes Mark Lewis to be a
monster probably cannot make good her claim in light of the
preceding objections.
3. Bates and Lewis as Aristotelian monsters
I think that Norman Bates and Mark Lewis are monsters. But
there is no firm justification for this fact in either Carroll's or
Freeland's views. One will find one in Aristotle's concept of
monstrosity - or I should say, in Aristotle's view modified.
Aristotle, of course, believed that purpose was pervasive
throughout nature, an idea that today has little backing. The
idea of an Aristotelian monster, however, needs only the
concept of the normal development of members of a species
and of individual deviations from this normal development.
However, individuals can deviate a bit from the normal
development of their species without turning into monsters -
for example, a dog with one gray eye and one brown eye. An
Aristotelian monster, then, is an individual that deviates
strikingly from the normal development of a species - that is,
who deviates sufficiently to elicit our pity and possibly
revulsion.
Norman Bates and Mark Lewis are such individuals. They are
psychological analogues of the two-headed calf. We expect that
the normal development of a human being will produce a
person with an autonomous will, someone capable of acting on
desires and values that are freely chosen. We think that normal
people should "be themselves," as we say. Yet Norman Bates
suffers from an extreme form of maternal identification
compounded by severe schizophrenia. He is driven to behave
as he thinks his mother would, though when himself he recoils
from what "she" has done. And his madness is manifested in
such macabre ways (not only does he murder young women as
his mother, he keeps his mother's preserved corpse as a
housemate).
We also expect that in the course of normal development a
human will come to be a person whose sexual drive when
directed at another is aimed at mutual pleasure. But Mark
Lewis is afflicted not just with voyeurism but with a perversion
of voyeurism. Lewis doesn't want to watch naked women or
people having sex like a normal voyeur; he wants to watch
women watching themselves as they're murdered. After
meeting Helen, he doesn't want to do these things any more
and briefly seeks treatment, though his compulsion reasserts
itself and suicide seems his only other option.
Besides Norman Bates and Mark Lewis, other fictional
Aristotelian monsters include the cast of Tod Browning's Freaks
(1932); John Merrick of The Elephant Man (1980) and the
deformed baby in Eraserhead (1977), both by David Lynch;
and the creepy twin gynecologists of David Cronenberg's Dead
Ringers (1988). Certainly, these unfortunates are striking
deviations from the human norm.
Aristotelian monsters differ from Carroll's monsters in that
Aristotelian monsters are possible in the real world while
Carroll's monsters are impossible in the real world. The giant
ants of Gordon Douglas's classic Them (1954), mutated by
radiation from bomb tests, and the attacking birds of
Hitchcock's The Birds (1963) are not simply striking deviations
from the normal development of ants and birds. They are
scientifically impossible deviations (and in any case, elicit fear
not pity). As Hitchcock's amateur ornithologist points out in the
seaside cafe: gulls and crows do not attack humans, different
species of birds never flock together, birds are not intelligent
enough to plan attacks, and so on.
Clearly, Aristotelian monsters cannot be entirely fictional, for
there must be an existent species - a real norm outside the
fiction - against which a fictional being exhibits deviant
development. Man-eating blobs, brain-stealing pods,
werewolves, and other entirely fictional monsters cannot be
mistakes of nature for they have no counterparts in nature
from which they deviate. The acid-drooling dinosaur-like beast
of Ridley Scott's Alien (1979) is probably a perfectly developed
example of its (fictional) species (certainly it behaves as the
robot-scientist aboard the spaceship expected). Ridley's
creation is a monster on Carroll's concept for it elicits fear and
disgust, but it is not an Aristotelian monster.
Carroll and Freeland each have a plausible concept of
monstrosity; they err only by insisting that theirs is the unique
concept of monstrosity (if indeed they do so insist). No one
concept of monstrosity fits all monsters, and I've argued that
only Aristotle's can account for the monstrosity we sense in
Norman Bates and Mark Lewis. It should be pointed out that
Carroll's and Freeland's main target is the definition of the
genre of horror. Their concepts of monstrosity are designed to
fit that project. For each writer, a horror story is by definition
one that includes a monster. My sense is that only the
Aristotelian monsters that arouse pity and revulsion will make
a story into one of horror, and this because revulsion is an
emotion similar to horror. This is why The Elephant Man is not
a horror film (the John Merrick character arouses pity but not
revulsion), and why Psycho and Peeping Tom are horror films.
The character of Norman Bates and Mark Lewis initially arouse
sympathy and perhaps pity, but then at the end elicit
revulsion.[14]
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